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Gambling disorder is characterized by persistent and recurrent maladaptive gambling
behavior, which leads to clinically significant impairment or distress. The disorder is
associated with dysfunctions in the dopamine system. The dopamine system codes
reward anticipation and outcome evaluation. Reward anticipation refers to dopaminergic
activation prior to reward, while outcome evaluation refers to dopaminergic activation after
reward. This article reviews evidence of dopaminergic dysfunctions in reward anticipation
and outcome evaluation in gambling disorder from two vantage points: a model of reward
prediction and reward prediction error by Wolfram Schultz et al. and a model of “wanting”
and “liking” by Terry E. Robinson and Kent C. Berridge. Both models offer important
insights on the study of dopaminergic dysfunctions in addiction, and implications for the
study of dopaminergic dysfunctions in gambling disorder are suggested.
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NEUROBIOLOGICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF REWARD
ANTICIPATION AND OUTCOME EVALUATION IN GAMBLING
DISORDER
Gambling disorder is characterized by persistent and recurrent
maladaptive gambling behavior, which leads to clinically signif-
icant impairment or distress (American Psychiatric Association
[DSM 5], 2013). Gambling disorder was recently reclassified
from “pathological gambling” (an impulse control disorder) to
a “behavioral addiction” under the substance use classification,
which emphasizes the association between gambling disorder and
other types of addiction.
Gambling disorder is associated with dysfunctions in the
dopamine system. The dopamine system is sensitive to behavioral
stimulation related to monetary reward, particularly in the ventral
striatum (Koepp et al., 1998; Delgado et al., 2000; Breiter et al.,
2001; de la Fuente-Fernández et al., 2002; Zald et al., 2004).
Dopaminergic dysfunctions in the ventral striatum are linked to
gambling disorder (Reuter et al., 2005; Abler et al., 2006; Linnet
et al., 2010, 2011a,b, 2012; van Holst et al., 2012; Linnet, 2013).
The dopamine system codes reward anticipation and outcome
evaluation. Reward anticipation refers to dopaminergic activation
prior to reward, while outcome evaluation refers to dopaminer-
gic activation after the reward. This article reviews evidence on
dopaminergic dysfunctions in reward anticipation and outcome
evaluation in gambling disorder from two vantage points: a model
of reward prediction and reward prediction error by Schultz et al.
(Fiorillo et al., 2003; Schultz, 2006; Tobler et al., 2007; Schultz
et al., 2008), and a model of “wanting” and “linking” by Robinson
and Berridge (Robinson and Berridge, 1993, 2000, 2003, 2008;
Berridge and Aldridge, 2008; Berridge et al., 2009). It is suggested
that gambling disorder may provide a “model disorder” of addic-
tion for the two approaches, which is not confounded by ingestion
of exogenous substances.
The ventral striatum and the nucleus accumbens (NAcc) play
a central role in both models, which is consistent with findings
of dopamine dysfunctions in the ventral striatum in gambling
disorder. Therefore, this review focuses on the ventral striatum
in relation to gambling disorder. Other relevant areas include the
prefrontal cortex (e.g., orbitofrontal cortex) and other areas of the
basal ganglia (e.g., the putamen, nucleus or caudate).
REWARD PREDICTION AND REWARD PREDICTION ERROR
Reward prediction refers to the anticipation of reward, while
reward prediction error refers to the outcome evaluation. Reward
prediction and reward prediction error are associated with the
learning of reward properties of stimuli. According to Wolfram
Schultz (2006), reward prediction and reward prediction error
derive from Kamin’s blocking rule (Kamin, 1969), which suggests
that a reward that is fully predicted does not contribute to
learning. A stimulus that can be entirely predicted contains no
new information, and the reward prediction error rate is therefore
zero. Rescola and Wagner described the so-called Rescola-Wagner
learning rule (Rescola and Wagner, 1972), which states that learn-
ing slows progressively as the reinforcer becomes more predicted.
In random binary outcome conditions, e.g., reward vs. no-
reward, the expected value (EV) is the average value that can be
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expected from a given stimulus, which is a linear function of
reward probability. In contrast, uncertainty, which can be defined
as the variance (σ 2) of a probability distribution (Schultz et al.,
2008), is the mean squared deviation from the EV, which is an
inverse U-shaped function. Midbrain and striatal dopamine cod-
ing of EV and uncertainty follow linear and quadratic functions
of reward prediction similar to their mathematical expressions
(Fiorillo et al., 2003; Preuschoff et al., 2006; Schultz, 2006). The
dopamine system also codes deviations in outcome from the
reward prediction, i.e., reward prediction error: “. . .dopamine
neurons emit a positive signal (activation) when an appetitive
event is better than predicted, no signal (no change in activity)
when an appetitive event occurs as predicted, and a negative
signal (decreased activity) when an appetitive event is worse than
predicted. . .[and] dopamine neurons show bidirectional coding
of reward prediction errors, following the equation Dopamine
response = Reward occurred−Reward predicted” (Schultz, 2006,
pp. 99–100).
Fiorillo et al. (2003) investigated dopamine activation in
reward prediction and reward prediction error in relation to EV
and uncertainty (i.e., variance in outcome). In the study, two
monkeys were exposed to stimuli with varying reward probabil-
ities (P = 0, P = 0.25, P = 0.5, P = 0.75 and P = 1.0). The rate
of anticipatory licking and the activation of dopamine neurons
in the ventral midbrain (area A8, A9 and A10) were recorded.
Dopaminergic coding of reward prediction was measured as a
phasic signal immediately after stimulus presentation, while cod-
ing of reward prediction error was measured as a phasic signal
immediately after the outcome of the stimulus (reward or no
reward). Dopaminergic coding of uncertainty was measured as a
sustained signal from stimulus presentation to outcome.
The authors reported three main results. First, the reward
probabilities of stimuli were correlated with the anticipatory
licking rate and the anticipatory phasic dopamine response. This
suggests that the reward probability reinforced the dopaminergic
activation and the behavioral response. Second, the sustained
dopamine response toward uncertainty followed the properties
of variance, i.e., it was largest toward stimuli with 50% reward
probability (P = 0.5), smaller toward stimuli with P = 0.75 and P =
0.25, and smallest toward stimuli with P = 1.0 and P = 0.0. Third,
rewarded stimuli with lower reward probability had a larger
phasic dopamine response following the reward, which suggests
a larger positive reward prediction error signal; rewarded stimuli
with higher reward probability had a smaller phasic dopamine
response following the reward, which suggests a smaller reward
prediction error signal.
Neurobiological studies of gambling in humans support the
evidence of reward prediction and reward prediction error. Abler
et al. (2006) used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI)
to investigate reward prediction and reward prediction error in
an incentive task where participants were shown five figures
associated with different reward probabilities (P = 0.0, P = 0.25,
P = 0.50, P = 0.75, and P = 1.0). The results showed a significant
anticipatory blood oxygen level dependent (BOLD) activation
in the NAcc, which was proportional to the reward probability.
Furthermore, there was a significant interaction between outcome
and BOLD activation in the NAcc, where the BOLD activation
was higher when low probability stimuli were rewarded, and lower
when high probability stimuli were rewarded.
Preuschoff et al. (2006) used a card guessing task to investi-
gate the relationship between risk and uncertainty in relation to
anticipated reward. The task consisted of 10 cards ranging from
1 to 10, where two cards were drawn in succession. Before the
drawing of the second card participants had to guess whether
the first card would be higher or lower than the second card.
The results showed that reward probability was linearly associated
with immediate BOLD activation: higher reward probability was
associated with a higher immediate anticipatory BOLD signal,
and lower reward probability was associated with a lower imme-
diate anticipatory BOLD signal. In contrast, uncertainty showed
an inverse U-shaped relation with late BOLD activation: the
highest anticipatory BOLD signals were seen around maximum
uncertainty (P = 0.5) and the lowest anticipatory BOLD signals
were seen around maximum certainty (P = 1.0 and P = 0.0).
Neurobiological studies support the notion of dopaminergic
dysfunctions of reward anticipation in gambling disorder. van
Holst et al. (2012) compared 15 gambling disorder sufferers with
16 healthy controls in a fMRI study investigating reward anticipa-
tion in a card guessing task. Gambling disorder sufferers showed
a significant increase in BOLD activation in the bilateral ventral
striatum and in the left orbitofrontal cortex toward gain-related
EV. This suggests an increased BOLD activation toward reward
anticipation. No differences in BOLD activation were found
toward outcome evaluation. Linnet et al. (2012) compared 18
gambling disorder sufferers and 16 healthy controls in a positron
emission tomography (PET) study using the Iowa Gambling Task
(IGT). Dopamine release in the striatum of gambling disorder
sufferers showed a significant inverted U-curve with the prob-
ability of advantageous IGT performance. Gambling disorder
sufferers with maximum uncertainty of outcome (P = 0.5) had
a larger dopamine release than individuals with IGT performance
closer to certain gains (P = 1.0) or certain losses (P = 0.0). This
is consistent with the notion of dopaminergic coding of uncer-
tainty. No interaction was found between dopamine release and
uncertainty among healthy control subjects, which could suggest
a stronger reinforcement of gambling behavior among gambling
disorder sufferers. Therefore, in gambling disorder dopaminergic
anticipation of reward and uncertainty might represent a dys-
functional reward anticipation, which reinforces the gambling
behavior despite losses.
In outcome evaluation the evidence suggests a blunted
dopamine response in gambling disorder sufferers. Reuter et al.
(2005) compared 12 gambling disorder sufferers with 12 healthy
controls in a card guessing task. Gambling disorder sufferers
showed a significantly lower BOLD response in the ventral stria-
tum toward winning compared with healthy controls. Further-
more, gambling disorder sufferers showed a significant negative
correlation between the BOLD activation and severity in gam-
bling symptoms, which suggests a blunted outcome evaluation in
gambling disorder.
One of the limitations of the reward prediction and reward
prediction error model is that it is not a theory of addiction or
gambling disorder, per se. In other words, while the increased
dopaminergic activation toward uncertainty might be a central
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mechanism in the reinforcement of gambling behavior, it does
not explain why some individuals become addicted to gambling,
while others do not. In contrast, the incentive-sensitization model
suggests that addictive behavior is associated with a combination
of dopaminergic reinforcement and changes to the dopamine
system (sensitization) following repeated drug exposure.
INCENTIVE-SENSITIZATION MODEL OF “WANTING” AND “LIKING”
Terry E. Robinson and Kent C. Berridge (Robinson and Berridge,
1993, 2000, 2003, 2008; Berridge and Aldridge, 2008; Berridge
et al., 2009) have proposed an incentive-sensitization model,
which distinguishes pleasure (“liking”) from incentive salience
(“wanting”) in addiction. “Wanting” is associated with antic-
ipation of reward, while “liking” is associated with outcome
evaluation.
The incentive-sensitization model focuses on the dopamine
system as a core neurobiological basis of addiction. The ventral
striatum and its main component the NAcc are associated with
addiction. Changes in the dopamine system associated with drug
exposure render the brain circuits hypersensitive or “sensitized”
to drugs or drug cues. Sensitization from repeated drug exposure
may also occur at the level of psychomotor or locomotor activity.
Sensitization is linked with increased incentive salience, which is
the cognitive process associated with drug seeking and drug taking
behavior. Incentive salience (“wanting”) refers to a motivational
state, which can be conscious or unconscious, goal-oriented or
non goal-oriented, and pleasurable or non-pleasurable:
“The quotation marks around the term “wanting” serve as
caveat to acknowledge that incentive salience means something
different from the ordinary common language sense of the word
wanting. For one thing, “wanting” in the incentive salience sense
need not have a conscious goal or declarative target. . . . Incentive
salience is separable from beliefs and declarative goals that consti-
tute cognitive aspects of “wanting”” (Berridge and Aldridge, 2008,
pp. 8–9).
Incentive salience (“wanting”) increases after repeated expo-
sure to drugs and drug cues, while pleasure (“liking”) remains the
same or decreases over time. The incentive-sensitization model
of “wanting” and “liking” offers an explanation for the apparent
paradox that individuals with substance use disorder have an
increased desire for drugs despite getting less pleasure from taking
them. Incentive “hotspots” have been identified in the NAcc: acti-
vation in the medial NAcc shell is distinctly associated with “lik-
ing”, while activation throughout the NAcc (particularly around
the ventral pallidum) is associated with “wanting” (Berridge et al.,
2009).
Incentive sensitization defines the relationship between incen-
tive salience and sensitization. Incentive salience must be coupled
with sensitization to account for addictive behavior: an increase
in dopamine binding does not define incentive sensitization,
but an increase in dopamine binding in relation to particular
drug cues does; locomotor activity does not indicate incentive
sensitization, but running around to get drugs does; psychomo-
tor preoccupation does not indicate incentive sensitization, but
an obsession with taking drugs does. Therefore, simple rein-
forcement of behavior is insufficient to account for addictive
behavior.
“The central idea is that addictive drugs enduringly alter NAcc-
related brain systems that mediate a basic incentive-motivational
function, the attribution of incentive salience. As a consequence,
these neural circuits may become enduringly hypersensitive (or
“sensitized”) to specific drug effects and to drug-associated stim-
uli (via activation by S-S associations). The drug-induced brain
change is called neural sensitization. We proposed that this leads
psychologically to excessive attribution of incentive salience to
drug-related representations, causing pathological “wanting” to
take drugs” (Robinson and Berridge, 2003, p. 36).
Berridge and Aldridge (2008) provide an example of the
incentive-sensitization approach to research in addiction. In this
approach, animals are trained under two conditions: first, the ani-
mals are conditioned to work (press a lever) for rewards (e.g., food
pellets), and must persist working to earn rewards. In a separate
training session the animals receive rewards without having to
work for them, where each reward is associated with an auditory
tone cue for 10–30 s, which is the conditioned stimulus (CS+).
After training, the animals are tested in an extinction paradigm
where “wanting” is measured as the number of lever presses the
animal is willing to perform without receiving a reward. Since
the animals receive no rewards, the “wanting” is not confounded
by consumption of reward. The key of the paradigm is to test
changes in behavior when the conditioned auditory stimulus
is introduced during different drug induced states. In a series
of studies, Wyvell and Berridge (2000, 2001) showed that rats
injected with amphetamine microinjections in the NAcc shell had
significantly more lever presses when the conditioned auditory
stimulus was introduced compared to rats injected with saline
microinjections. In a related experiment, Wyvell and Berridge
(2000, 2001) found that the measures of liking (facial reaction
to receiving a sugar reward) did not differ whether the animals
received saline or amphetamine microinjections. These findings
suggest that amphetamine is associated with an increased cue-
triggered “wanting”, but not with increased pleasure (“liking”)
from receiving the reward.
The incentive-sensitization model’s suggestions of increased
“wanting” and decreased “liking” in addiction are consistent with
the findings from the gambling disorder literature of increased
dopamine activation to anticipated reward (Fiorillo et al., 2003;
Abler et al., 2006; Preuschoff et al., 2006; Linnet et al., 2011a,
2012) and blunted dopamine activation to outcome of reward
(Reuter et al., 2005). These findings suggest that dopaminer-
gic dysfunctions toward anticipated rewards, rather than actual
rewards, reinforce gambling behavior among gambling disorder
sufferers. The sensitization of the dopamine system toward antic-
ipated rewards rather than incurred rewards can explain why
gambling disorder sufferers continue gambling despite losses, and
might play a central role in the formation of erroneous percep-
tions about the likelihood of winning from gambling (Benhsain
et al., 2004).
One of the limitations of the incentive-sensitization model is
that individuals with substance use disorder have lower dopamine
release and lower dopamine receptor availability despite having
increased incentive-sensitization:
“However, it must be acknowledged that the current literature
contains conflicting results about brain dopamine changes in
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addicts. For example, it has been reported that detoxified cocaine
addicts actually show a decrease in evoked dopamine release
rather than the sensitized increase described above. . . . Another
finding in humans that seems inconsistent with sensitization is
that cocaine addicts are reported to have low levels of striatal
dopamine D2 receptors even after long abstinence. . . . This sug-
gests a hypodopaminergic state rather than a sensitized state”
(Robinson and Berridge, 2008, p. 3140).
While lower binding potentials are reported in substance use
disorders, there is no evidence of decreased binding potentials
in the gambling disorder literature (Linnet, 2013). Therefore,
gambling disorder might serve as a “model” disorder for the
incentive-sensitization model, as gambling is not confounded by
the ingestion of exogenous substances.
IMPLICATIONS OF REWARD ANTICIPATION AND OUTCOME
EVALUATION IN GAMBLING DISORDER
The models by Schultz et al. and Robinson and Berridge provide
important insights on the study on gambling disorder. The reward
prediction and reward prediction error model by Schultz et al.
offers an explanation for the behavioral reinforcement of reward
anticipation in addiction, while the incentive-sensitization model
by Robinson and Berridge explains the mechanisms of “wanting”
and “liking” in addiction. At the same time, gambling disorder
may serve as a “model” disorder in addressing certain aspects of
the two models.
First, the lower levels of binding potentials reported in sub-
stance use disorder are not seen in gambling disorder (Linnet
et al., 2010, 2011a,b, 2012; Clark et al., 2012; Boileau et al.,
2013). This might suggest that incentive sensitization can occur
independently of baseline dopamine binding in support of the
incentive-sensitization model.
Second, while the studies by Fiorillo et al. (2003) and
Preuschoff et al. (2006) support the notion of sustained antici-
patory dopamine activation toward uncertainty, more research is
needed to determine whether or not this mechanism is associated
with dopaminergic dysfunctions in gambling disorder.
Third, the gambling disorder literature suggests increased
brain activation toward reward anticipation and blunted acti-
vation toward outcome evaluation. This is consistent with the
incentive-sensitization model’s suggestion of increased “want-
ing” but decreased “liking” in addiction and the notion of
sustained anticipatory dopamine activation in reward predic-
tion. Dopaminergic dysfunction in reward anticipation might
constitute a common mechanism of addiction, because it
occurs in the absence of reward. Therefore, reward anticipa-
tion may have a similar (dys)function, whether the reward
is food, drugs or gambling. Further studies should address
reward anticipation and outcome evaluation in gambling
disorder.
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